LEGISLATIVE AUTONOMY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES INNIGERIAN STATES: A STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM ANALYSIS

Abstract

Legislative autonomy remains a crucial component of democratic consolidation and good governance in federal systems. In Nigeria, the quest for functional State Houses of Assembly has intensified due to increasing and excessive dominance of the executive, weak legislative capacity and the inability of the state legislatures to effectively perform their constitutionally assigned duties. This paper examines the nexus between legislative autonomy and good governance outcomes in Nigerian States through the theoretical lens of Structural Functionalism. The paper analyses how the functional capacity of state legislatures in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has been compromised by limited autonomy, thereby affecting their capacity to perform essential functions for maintaining democratic stability and development. Drawing on documentary analysis of constitutional provisions, judicial rulings, reform efforts such as Executive Order 10 and existing scholarship, the paper reveals that inadequate financial and administrative independence of State Houses of Assembly undermines legislative oversight, transparency, accountability and service delivery of the state level. The findings also indicate that political interference has really inhibited the independence and effectiveness of state legislature. The paper concludes that full legislative autonomy is indispensable for strengthening democratic governance, enhancing fiscal responsibility, promoting rule of law and delivering public sector reforms. Recommendations include constitutional enforcement mechanisms, strengthening internal legislative bureaucracy, fiscal discipline frameworks and robust civic engagement.